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Abstract
The paper proposes a parsimonious and flexible semiparametric quantile regression speci-
fication for asymmetric bidders within the independent private value framework. Asymmetry
is parameterized using powers of a parent private value distribution, which is generated by
a quantile regression specification. As noted in Cantillon (2008), this covers and extends
models used for efficient collusion, joint bidding and mergers among homogeneous bidders.
The specification can be estimated for ascending auctions using the winning bids and the
winner’s identity. The estimation is two stage. The asymmetry parameters are estimated
from the winner’s identity using a simple maximum likelihood procedure. The parent quan-
tile regression specification can be estimated using simple modifications of Gimenes (2017).
A timber application reveals that weaker bidders have 30% less chances to win the auction
than stronger ones. It is also found that increasing participation in an asymmetric ascend-
ing auction may not be as beneficial as using an optimal reserve price as would have been
expected from a result of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) valid under symmetry.
JEL: C14, D44
Keywords: Private values; asymmetry; ascending auctions; seller expected revenue; quantile
regression; two stage quantile regression estimation.
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1 Introduction
Asymmetry among bidders may arise from many factors, for example, differences in taste
or specialization, degree of information, productivity, costs, firm size, joint bidding or col-
lusion among a subgroup of buyers. It is, therefore, likely that symmetric bidding is only
a theoretical approximation that may not fit well many auction markets. Within the inde-
pendent private value paradigm (IPV hereafter), the revenue equivalence theorem no longer
holds with asymmetric bidders and first-price auction can be inefficient, see Krishna (2009)
and the references therein. Cantillon (2008) supports the common belief that competition
is reduced by bidders asymmetries. She shows that asymmetry decreases the seller expected
revenue in first-price and second-price auctions, when compared to revenues achieved with
a benchmark symmetric private value distribution. The timber auction revenue analysis of
Roberts and Sweeting (2016) shows that reducing the participation of strong bidders can
considerably lower the seller expected revenue.
Myerson (1981) suggests to depart from standard formats and describes an optimal auc-
tion which restores some competition by handicapping strong bidders. This mechanism
critically involves the private value distribution and is difficult to implement. In an em-
pirical study of snow removal contract sealed procurements, Flambard and Perrigne (2006)
considered this optimal auction and an alternative subsidy policy. Krasnokutskaya and Seim
(2011) studied a bid preference program for California highway auction, see also Marion
(2007). Athey, Coey and Levin (2013) focused on set-asides and subsidies for timber auc-
tions.
Among the aforementioned empirical works, the only papers adopting a nonparametric
approach are Flambard and Perrigne (2006) and Marion (2007), who studied first-price
auctions. For first-price auctions, Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Athey, Levin and Seira
(2011) and Athey et al. (2013) all considered parametric specifications, as did Roberts and
Sweeting (2016) for ascending auctions.
There are, however, some works devoted to the nonparametric approach for ascending
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auctions with asymmetric bidders. A theoretical nonparametric identification result with
a finite number of asymmetric types due to Komarova (2013a) shows that the asymmetric
valuation distributions can be recovered from the winning bid and the identity of the winner
under IPV, see also Athey and Haile (2002). Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006) have proposed
a related semi-nonparametric estimation procedure. Lamy (2012) shows that nonparametric
identification still holds under anonymity for second-price auctions when all the bids are
observed. Set identification results are also available for affiliated models, which are not
point identified as shown by Athey and Haile (2002). For affiliated values and second-
price auction, Komarova (2013b) gives bounds for joint private value distribution, assuming
identities are available. Coey, Larsen, Sweeney and Waisman (2017) consider a more difficult
scenario, where only the winning bid is observed and anonymity is possible. They obtained
bounds for the seller expected revenue and bidder surplus which extends upon the ones of
Aradillas-Lo´pez, Gandhi and Quint (2013) for the symmetric case.
Developing nonparametric approaches for asymmetric bidders with a discrete number of
types is difficult, because a different value distribution must be estimated for each types, as
in Flambard and Perrigne (2006) or Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006). Dividing the sample
in subsamples defined by a given type may result in small subsamples in addition to poor
nonparametric estimation rates due to the curse of dimensionality. Comparing the valuation
distribution across types is not an easy task. In this paper, we tackle these two issues
through a semiparametric approach allowing for a nonparametric component common to each
type and using a parametric description of type heterogeneity. The common nonparametric
component is a parent private value conditional distribution F (v|x), where x is an auction
specific good covariate. Following Gimenes (2017), we assume that F (v|x) corresponds to a
quantile regression model, so that this rich and flexible specification can be estimated with a
standard parametric rate independently of the dimension of x. The asymmetry parameter,
say λi, is an exponent specific to bidder i, whose private value distribution is
Fi(v|x) = F λi(v|x).
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The exponent λi can be an individual fixed effect which captures unobserved bidder charac-
teristics. As developed in the paper, it can also be a parametric function of some observed
bidder variables and fixed effect parameters. In our timber application, the buyers are either
mill or logger, which are considered as weak and strong bidders respectively in all applica-
tions.
Cantillon (2008) has used a similar specification for theoretical illustration purpose, not-
ing that it has been used to “model efficient collusion, joint bidding and mergers among
homogeneous bidders”, which can be relevant for many applications. Indeed, when λi is an
integer number, F λi(v|x) is the distribution of the maximum value of λi symmetric bidders
with independent valuations drawn from F (v|x), as relevant, for instance, in joint bidding.
This feature also shows that the asymmetry parameter λi is a measure of the “strength” of
bidder i. A small numerical experiment in the paper parallels Cantillon (2008), adopting an
econometric point of view based on the symmetric private value distribution which would
be estimated ignoring asymmetry by the quantile procedure of Gimenes (2017). Such a mis-
specification may lead to underestimation of the optimal reserve price and seller expected
revenue.
The proposed estimation is two stage, based upon the winning bid and identity of the
winner. The first stage estimates the parameters appearing in the asymmetry exponent
λi using a maximum likelihood procedure based upon the winner identity. The intuition
behind this procedure is that the distribution of the winner identity only depends upon the
relative buyers’ strength, and hence on asymmetry parameter λi and not upon the common
parent distribution F (v|x). The second stage estimates the quantile regression specification
associated with F (v|x). As in Gimenes (2017), it is based on a quantile regression estimation
which uses a transformation of the quantile levels. Accounting for asymmetry leads to
considering a transformation which depends upon the estimated asymmetry parameter. This
latter step parallels Arellano and Bonhomme (2017), who similarly estimate a quantile level
transformation in a three stage quantile regression procedure.
The empirical application illustrates the methodology using USFS timber ascending auc-
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tions. Two kinds of firms are competing: firms with manufacturing capacity (mills, usually
considered as strong bidders in the literature) and firms lacking manufacturing capabilities
(loggers). The estimated asymmetry exponent of the loggers is 30% less than the one of the
mills, suggesting that, roughly speaking, two mills should be replaced by three loggers to
generate an ascending auction with similar features. The empirical application also studies
the seller expected revenue as a function of the proportion of loggers and the number of
buyers. It reveals economically significant variations, in the range of 9% − 20% between
ascending auctions attended only by loggers or only by mills. In small auctions with two
bidders, changing a logger by a mill can increase the seller optimal expected revenue by 5%
in some cases, and still as high as 1% with 12 bidders. This suggests that seller expected
revenue bounds that does not account for the proportion of each type can be considerably
large, and that the ones averaging over types participation, as in Coey et al. (2017), can
be less informative. Another finding relates to an important result of Bulow and Klemperer
(1996) stating that, under symmetry, increasing participation is more beneficial than us-
ing an optimal auction. Several violations of this result are observed, especially due to the
presence of weak bidders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the auction setup and the asym-
metric quantile specification. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 give the identification strategy and discuss
identification of the parameter of asymmetry under several specifications. Section 3 shows
how to design the optimal reserve price policy when bidders are asymmetric and studies the
consequences of a symmetric misspecification for the seller’s expected revenue. The two-step
estimator is proposed in Section 4 and its asymptotic distribution is obtained. A simulation
of the methodology is given in Section 5 and an empirical application using USFS timber
ascending auctions is studied in Section 6. The proofs of all the results given in the paper
are grouped in the Appendix A. Appendix B contains tables not displayed in the application
section to save space.
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2 Semiparametric quantile specifications
A single and indivisible object with observed characteristics x ∈ Rd is auctioned to N ≥ 2
bidders through an ascending auction. Each bidder has a specific characteristic Zi, i =
1, . . . , N . The auction covariates x, the number of bidders N participating in the auction
and the associated bidder covariates Zi, i = 1, . . . , N are common knowledge to buyers and
sellers, and observed by the analyst. Within the IPV paradigm, each bidder i = 1, · · · , N
is assumed to have a private value Vi for the auctioned good, which is not observed by
other bidders. The bidder only knows his own private value, but it is common knowledge
for bidders and sellers that each private value has been independently drawn from a c.d.f.
Fi(·|X,Zi) conditional upon (X,Zi), X = (1, x′)′, or equivalently, with a conditional quantile
function
Vi(τ |X,Zi) := F−1i (τ |X,Zi), τ in [0, 1] . (2.1)
It will be assumed later on that the analyst observes L identically drawn auctions. For each
auction `, the winning bid W` and winner’s identity, the number N` of bidders, the good
covariate X` and the bidder characteristics Z` = [Z1`, . . . , ZN`] are observed. As shown later,
the assumption that the identity of the winner is observed can be relaxed when bidders are
characterized using discrete types. In this case, it is sufficient to observe the type of the
winner and the numbers of bidders within a given type.
As in the symmetric private value setting, the dominant strategy for non-winners is to
bid up to their true valuation. It will, therefore, be assumed that
Assumption 1 The winning bid is the second-highest bidder’s private value.
See Haile and Tamer (2003), Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006), Aradillas-Lo´pez et al.
(2013), Coey et al. (2017), and Gimenes (2017) for similar assumptions and related dis-
cussions.
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2.1 Asymmetric private value quantile specification
The proposed model combines an asymmetry function
λi = λ(Zi;αi, β) > 0 (2.2)
with a parent conditional distribution F (·|X) which only depends upon the good covariates
and is generated by a quantile regression
F−1 (τ |X) = X ′γ (τ) (2.3)
assuming that the first entry of X is a constant term. In (2.2), the αi are bidder fixed
effects parameter which can capture some unobserved bidder heterogeneity. In what follows
α = [α1, . . . , αN ].
Assumption 2 Suppose (2.2) and (2.3) hold. There are some α, β and a vector function
γ (·) such that
Fi (·|X,Zi) = [F (·|X)]λi (2.4)
for all admissible X,Zi and all i = 1, . . . , N .
Cantillon (2008) refers to distributions of the type of (2.4) as a class of distributions for
which a quasi-ordering of potential bidders is available. This specification accommodates
asymmetries that arise from merger, joint bidding or collusion among homogeneous bidders.
See e.g. Graham and Marshall (1987), Mailath and Zemsky (1991), McAfee and McMillan
(1992), Brannman and Froeb (2000) and Waehrer and Perry (2003).
Assumption 2 is equivalent to the quantile specification
Vi (τ |X,Zi) = X ′γ
[
τ 1/λ(Zi;αi,β)
]
(2.5)
which shows that asymmetry comes from a bidder specific transformation of the quantile
level τ . As detailed below, the power specification is particularly convenient to establish
6
identification. Examples of parametric λ(Zi;αi, β) are considered later on, but nonparametric
specifications are also possible although not investigated here. The slope coefficient γ (·) is
the nonparametric element of the model. It can, however, be estimated with a parametric
rate as expected from the quantile regression and shown later on. The asymmetric power
exponent 1/λ(Zi;αi, β) measures the bidder strength: if λ(Zi;αi, β) > λ(Zj;αj, β) then
bidder i dominates bidder j in a first-order stochastic dominance sense, i.e. Fi(·|X,Zi) ≤
Fj(·|X,Zj) with a strict inequality inside the common support of these distribution. Note
that the private value distributions have the same support [V (0|X) , V (1|X)] of the parent
distribution. When λ(Zi;αi, β) goes to infinity, Vi (τ |X,Zi) converges to V (1|X) while it
goes to V (0|X) when λ(Zi;αi, β) goes to 0.
Additional standard assumptions on the parent quantile slope function γ (·) and the
function λ (·; ·) are as follows. In the last assumption, Θ is the compact set of admissible
asymmetry parameters (α, β) and Z is the compact support of the bidder characteristic Zi.
Assumption 3 The vector of auction specific variables, X = [1, x′0]
′, has a dimension of
(d+ 1) × 1. The random vector x0 has a compact support X0 ⊂ (0,+∞)d. The matrix
E [XX ′] has an inverse.
Assumption 4 V (·|X) is continuously differentiable over (0, 1) with a derivative V (1) (·|X)
which is strictly positive for all X in X = {1} × X0.
Assumption 5 It holds inf(z,a,b)∈Z×Θ inf1≤i≤N λ (z; ai, b) > 0. The function λ (z; ai, b) is
twice continuously differentiable with respect to ai and b. The true value (α, β) of the asym-
metry parameter lies in the interior of Θ.
2.2 Identification
The proposed identification procedure is in two steps, which are constructive enough to
develop a simple estimation procedure. The first step aims to identify the bidder asymmetry
parameters α and β from the observed winner’s identity.
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Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then for any i = 1, . . . , N
P (Bidder i wins the auction|X,Z) = λ(Zi;αi, β)∑N
j=1 λ(Zj;αj, β)
. (2.6)
Proof of Lemma 1. Let
G (w, i|X,Z) = P (W ≤ w and i wins the auction|X,Z)
be the joint distribution of winning bids and winner’s identity. Due to private value inde-
pendence, it holds, as shown in Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006),
G (w, i|X,Z) = P
(
max
1≤j 6=i≤N
vj ≤ w and max
1≤j 6=i≤N
vj ≤ vi
∣∣∣∣X,Z)
= P
(
max
1≤j 6=i≤N
vj ≤ min (w, vi)
∣∣∣∣X,Z)
=
∫ w
0
{ ∏
1≤j 6=i≤N
Fj (u|X,Zj)
}
dFi (u|X,Zi) +
{ ∏
1≤j 6=i≤N
Fj (w|X,Zj)
}
(1− Fi (w|X,Zi))
=
∫ w
0
(1− Fi (u|X,Zi)) d
{ ∏
1≤j 6=i≤N
Fj (u|X,Zj)
}
where the last line is obtained by integration by parts. Then, Assumption 2 gives
G (w, i|X,Z) =
∫ w
0
(
1− [F (u|X)]λi
)
d [F (u|X)]
∑
1≤j 6=i≤N λj
= [F (w|X)]
∑
1≤j 6=i≤N λj −
∑
1≤j 6=i≤N λj∑N
j=1 λj
[F (w|X)]
∑N
j=1 λj . (2.7)
It follows
P (Bidder i wins the auction|X,Z) = G (+∞, i|X,Z)
= 1−
∑
1≤j 6=i≤N λj∑N
j=1 λj
=
λi∑N
j=1 λj
. 
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Suppose that the equation system with unknowns a and b in Θ
λ(Zi; ai, b)∑N
j=1 λ(Zj; aj, b)
=
λ(Zi;αi, β)∑N
j=1 λ(Zj;αj, β)
, i = 1, . . . , N, (2.8)
has a unique solution, α and β. Then, Lemma 1 shows that the winner’s identity distribution
identifies the asymmetry parameters α and β. Identification on a case by case basis with
examples of functions λ(·; ·, ·) and parameter set Θ ensuring identification of the asymmetry
parameters is given in the next section. The probability of winning is very often used to
assess the presence of asymmetry among the bidders, see Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995),
Flambard and Perrigne (2006) for first-price sealed bid auctions and Brendstrup and Paarsch
(2006) for ascending auctions.
Identification of the parent quantile regression slope γ (·) follows in a second step, using
the winning bid c.d.f. given that bidder i wins the auction,
G (w|X,Z, i) = G (w, i|X,Z)
G (+∞, i|X,Z)
where G (w, i|X,Z) is defined in (2.7). Define1
Ψi (τ ;Z, α, β) =
ΛN(Z;α, β)τ
ΛN|i(Z;α,β) − ΛN |i(Z;α, β)τΛN (Z;α,β)
λ(Zi;αi, β)
(2.9)
where
ΛN(Z;α, β) =
N∑
j=1
λ(Zj;αj, β),
ΛN |i(Z;α, β) = ΛN(Z;α, β)− λ(Zi;αi, β).
Then (2.7) yields that the winning bid c.d.f. given winner’s identity satisfies
G (w|X,Z, i) = Ψi [F (w|X) ;Z,N, α, β] .
1Note that Ψi (τ ;Z,α, β) should be written as Ψi (τ ;Z,N, α, β).
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Assuming that Ψi (·;Z, α, β) is strictly increasing, then, implies that the conditional winning
bids quantile function W (τ |X,Z, i) given that i wins is
W (τ |X,Z, i) = F−1 [Ψ−1i (τ ;Z, α, β) |X] = X ′γ [Ψ−1i (τ ;Z, α, β)] .
It follows that
W [Ψi (τ ;Z, α, β) |X,Z, i] = X ′γ (τ) . (2.10)
Identification of γ (·) easily follows as stated in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold, and that the asymmetry parameters
(α, β) are identified. Then the parent slope function γ (·) is also identified.
Proof of Proposition 2: See proof section. 
2.3 Identified bidder asymmetry specifications
Asymmetry parameter identification is a crucial condition, which holds for the following
standard choice of the function λ (·; ·, ·) under proper standardization of the asymmetry
parameter. For the third and fourth example given below, it is useful to assume that the
bidder covariate Zi` varies across auctions.
Example 1: Bidder fixed effects. In this example λ(Zi;αi, β) = αi, and (2.8) shows that
asymmetry parameter identification holds provided the system of equations with unknown
a = [a1, . . . , aN ] in Θ
ai∑N
j=1 aj
=
αi∑N
j=1 αj
, i = 1, . . . , N,
has a unique solution. As well known, this is ensured when
Θ =
{
a ∈ RN+∗|a1 = 1
}
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that is, the parent private value distribution is the first bidder private value distribution.2
Alternatively the simplex Θ =
{
a ∈ RN+∗|
∑N
i=1 ai = 1
}
is also possible. 
Example 2: Linear regression. The case of the regression specification λ(Zi;αi, β) =
Z ′iβ is particularly useful when the covariate Zi codes bidder types.
3 An example of contin-
uous Zi is provided by construction procurement, where Zi can group the bidder’s distance
to the construction site and her capacity. When β 6= 0, (2.8) gives the system
Z ′ib∑N
j=1 Zjb
=
Z ′iβ∑N
j=1 Z
′
iβ
, i = 1, . . . , N,
which is equivalent to Z ′ibZ
′
jβ = Z
′
iβZ
′
jb or b
′ZiZ ′jβ = β
′ZiZ ′jb for all bidder pair {i, j}. If
the range of ZiZ
′
j has a non-empty interior, differentiating with respect to the entries of
this matrix gives b′β = β′b, which implies bp1βp2 = βp1bp2 , for any pair (p1, p2). Hence, β is
identified up to a multiplicative constant and imposing that the first entry of β is 1 or that
β′β = 1 ensures identification. 
Example 3: Linear regression with bidder fixed effects. The case of λ(Zi`;αi, β) =
αi + Z
′
i`β can be dealt as in Example 2, augmenting Zi` to code bidder identities. 
Example 4: Exponential linear regression with bidder fixed effects. When the
Zi` entries can take negative values, a possible choice of the positive function λ (·; ·, ·) is
λ(Zi`;αi, β) = αi exp (Z
′
i`β). For this choice (2.8) implies
aj exp
(
Z ′j`b
)
ai exp (Z ′i`b)
=
αj exp
(
Z ′j`β
)
αi exp (Z ′i`β)
, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N.
2It is however possible to identify α1, strengthening Assumption 4 to ensure V
(1)(·) exists and is strictly
positive over [0, 1]. If so, V (τ) − V (0) is equivalent to V (1)(0)τ1/α1 , showing that α1 is identified from the
lower tail of the identified parent private value distribution. Implementing this in practice may however give
nonparametric consistency rates and is therefore not attempted here.
3Alternatively, a fixed effects specification as in Example 1 can be used provided the fixed effects αi can
only take K unknown values µ1, . . . , µK , where K is the number of types.
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Taking Zi` = Zj` shows that the fixed effects αi are identified up to scale, so that restricting
to the parameter spaces of Example 1 yields identification of α. (2.8) then becomes
(Zi` − Zj`)′ (b− β) = 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
which, provided Var (Zi` − Zj`) is full rank for some (i, j), ensures identification of β. 
3 Seller revenue and asymmetry misspecification
The proposed specification is convenient to compute and analyze the seller revenue. The
presence of a reserve price R = R (X,Z, V0), where V0 is the seller private value, requires
changing Assumption 1 into
Assumption 6 There is no transaction if all private values are below the reserve price.
Otherwise, the winning bid is the greater of the second-highest bidder’s private values and
the reserve price.
For a reserve price in the common support [V (0|X) , V (1|X)], consider the quantile
level r = r (X,Z, V0) = F (R|X) of R in the parent distribution. Under Assumption 4 it
therefore holds that R = V (r|X). It is convenient to abbreviate λ (Zi;αi, β), ΛN (Z;α, β),
ΛN |i (Z;α, β) into λi, ΛN and ΛN |i, respectively. The seller payoff in an auction with reserve
price R is
pi (r) = W I (W ≥ R) + V0I (W < R) ,
where W is the winning bid. The corresponding expected seller revenue is
Π (r|X,Z, V0) = E [pi (r) |X,Z, V0] .
3.1 Expected revenue and optimal reserve price
The next Proposition gives a quantile expression for the expected revenue and characterizes
the optimal reserve prices. Let ΛN = ΛN(Z;α, β) and ΛN |i = ΛN |i(Z;α, β) be as (2.9).
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Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 2, 4 and 6 hold. Then
(i) The probability of selling the auctioned good is (1− rΛN ).
(ii) The seller expected payoff is
Π (r|X,Z, V0) = V0rΛN +R
N∑
i=1
rΛN|i
(
1− rλi)
+
∫ 1
r
V (t|X)
{
(1−N) ΛN tΛN−1 +
N∑
i=1
ΛN |itΛN|i−1
}
dt. (3.1)
(iii) The optimal reserve price R∗ = V (r∗|X) satisfies
V0 = R∗ − V (1)(r∗|X) r∗
ΛN
N∑
i=1
(
r−λi∗ − 1
)
. (3.2)
Proof of Proposition 3: See proof section. 
Proposition 3 allows to estimate the seller expected revenue by replacing the asymmetry
coefficients λi and the parent private value quantile function V (·|·) by their estimates. The
optimal reserve price can be obtained solving an estimation of (3.2) but performing a nu-
merical maximization of the estimation of Π (r) can be preferred to avoid the estimation of
the derivative V (1) (·|·).
Compared to the case of symmetric bidders, Proposition 3-(ii) shows that the optimal
reserve price depends upon the number N of bidders and upon the bidder characteristics.
The impact of the asymmetry coefficients λi on the expected seller revenue and on the
optimal reserve price seems unclear. For Π (r), the ambiguity is due to the term −rΛN|i+λi
which increases with λi, while the other terms decrease. Observe similarly that, in (3.2),
1/ΛN decreases with λi while r
−λi increases. Cantillon (2008, Theorem 2) gives condition
that allows to rank two sets of asymmetry coefficients λi according to seller revenue.
In many cases, the seller must decide a reserve price before observing the number N of
bidders and the asymmetry parameter of the entrants. The expected revenue formula (3.1) is
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conditional on N and on the asymmetry parameters of the entrant, an information which is
not available but can be integrated out to produce a relevant expected revenue and optimal
reserve price.
3.2 The effect of a symmetric misspecification
To analyse the effect of a symmetric misspecification on the optimal reserve price and seller
revenue, we perform a numerical experiment with no covariate and two asymmetric bidders
with private values Fi (v) = (v
κ)λi , 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 and i = 1, 2. Higher κ gives private values
closer to 1 and values of the curvature parameter κ ranging from 1 to 50 are considered. High
and moderate asymmetry scenarios, with (λ1, λ2) set to (0.1, 3.9) and (0.1, 0.9) respectively
are considered.
To evaluate the effect of estimating a symmetric misspecified model, we derive the limiting
symmetric private value distribution by matching the distribution of winning bids with the
symmetric winning bid distribution. Under Assumption 1, the winning bid is equal to the
minimum between (V1, V2), therefore, the winning bids distribution is
Fλ,W (w) = P (min (V1, V2) ≤ w) = wκλ1 + wκλ2 − wκ(λ1+λ2), w ∈ [0, 1] .
For symmetric bidders, the function Ψi (·) does not depend upon i and is equal to
Ψ (τ) = 2τ − τ 2 = 1− (1− τ)2 .
Therefore, the symmetric private value c.d.f. Fλ,S (·) which generates the winning bid distri-
bution Fλ,W (·) must satisfy Ψ [Fλ,S] = Fλ,W so that
Fλ,S (v) = 1−
(
1− vκλ1 − vκλ2 + vκ(λ1+λ2))1/2 , v ∈ [0, 1] .
The c.d.f. Fλ,S (v) is the limit of any nonparametric estimator obtained by matching the
winning bid distribution of a misspecified symmetric bidder model with the observed one,
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see for instance Gimenes (2017). An optimal reserve price assuming symmetric bidders,
Rλ,S = Vλ,S (rλ,S) where Vλ,S (·) = F−1λ,S (·), solves the symmetric version of (3.2)
Rλ,S − V (1)λ,S (rλ,S) (1− rλ,S) = 0
where the seller private value V0 is set to 0 for the sake of simplicity. The expected seller
revenue achieved with Rλ,S under the true asymmetric private values distribution can then be
computed using (3.1). The reserve price Rλ,S and the corresponding expected seller revenue
are reported in the columns labeled “Misspecified” of the next table. The optimal reserve
price and seller revenue using the true private value distribution are reported under the label
“Asymmetry”.
Table 1: Misspecified symmetric versus true asymmetric models
Optimal Reserve Price Expected Seller Revenue
λ1 λ2 κ Asymmetry Misspecified Asymmetry Misspecified Percentage Loss
0.1 3.9 1 0.6630 0.5451 0.5389 0.5059 6.12%
2 0.7550 0.5995 0.6800 0.6054 10.97%
5 0.8558 0.6403 0.8223 0.6738 18.06%
10 0.9092 0.6671 0.8927 0.7230 19%
50 0.9730 0.7785 0.9707 0.7173 26.10%
0.1 0.9 1 0.4830 0.4420 0.2550 0.2535 0.59%
2 0.5559 0.4901 0.3948 0.3887 1.55%
5 0.6768 0.5773 0.5987 0.5767 3.67%
10 0.7676 0.6450 0.7336 0.6930 5.53%
50 0.8710 0.7785 0.9283 0.7148 23%
Table 1 reveals that ignoring asymmetry can lead to substantial loss in terms of seller
revenue, when the curvature parameter κ is high or in the high asymmetry scenario. Note
that the optimal expected revenue computed under the misspecified symmetric model is
always smaller than the one achieved with the correct asymmetric model. The optimal
reserve price is also substantially higher in the correct model with strong asymmetry.
The analysis presented here differs from Cantillon (2008)’s, who studies how presence of
asymmetry impacts seller expected revenue. She compares auctions with asymmetric private
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value distributions with a symmetric benchmark, and finds that asymmetry is associated
with lower expected revenue. Our comparison differs from hers in that we investigate what
happens if a truly asymmetric model is misspecified as symmetric - in which case, we find
that not accounting for asymmetry may lead to loss in revenue. In that sense, our analysis
supports and extends her findings. To see this, consider different scenarios of asymmetry
such that λ1 + λ2 = 1, with κ = 1, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Varying asymmetry levels
Optimal Reserve Price Expected Seller Revenue
λ1 λ2 Asymmetry Misspecified Asymmetry Misspecified Percentage Loss
0.1 0.9 0.4830 0.4420 0.2550 0.2535 0.59%
0.2 0.8 0.4680 0.4433 0.2593 0.2590 0.14%
0.3 0.7 0.4550 0.4442 0.2627 0.2627 0.003%
0.4 0.6 0.4470 0.4440 0.2648 0.2648 0.0003%
0.5 0.5 0.4440 0.4449 0.2655 0.2655 0.00%
As can be seen, higher asymmetry when (λ1, λ2) is (0.1,0.9) has lesser revenue than the
symmetric case of (0.5,0.5), supporting Cantillon’s finding that “the expected revenue is
lower the more asymmetric bidders are”. However, given ex-ante asymmetry among bid-
ders, a misspecified symmetric model always has smaller expected revenue and higher the
asymmetry, more is the potential loss in revenue due to misspecification.
4 Estimation and asymptotic inference
Suppose that for each auction `, the analyst observes the winning bid W`, the good covariate
X`, the number of bidders N`, the bidder covariate Z` and the identity I
∗
` of the winner. The
proposed estimation method is in two step and closely follows the identification procedure.
As stated in Lemma 1, the probability that bidder i wins is
pi (i|Z`, N`, α, β) = λ(Zi`;αi, β)∑N`
j=1 λ(Zj`;αj, β)
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so that the asymmetry parameter (α, β) can be estimated using the maximum likelihood
estimator (
α̂, β̂
)
= arg max
(α,β)∈Θ
L∑
`=1
lnpi (I∗` |Z`, N`, α, β) . (4.1)
The second step consists in the estimation of the parent quantile slope and is based upon
(2.10), which identifies γ (·) as shown in Proposition 2. Define, for Ψi (τ ;Z,N, α, β) as in
(2.9),
Φ̂` (τ) = Φ`
(
τ ; α̂, β̂
)
= ΨI∗`
(
τ ;Z`, N`, α̂, β̂
)
.
The quantile level Φ̂` (τ) is an estimation of the (random) quantile level ΨI∗` (τ ;Z`, α, β)
which is such that the quantile function of the winning bid given X`, Z`, N` and I
∗
` satisfies
W
[
ΨI∗` (τ ;Z`, α, β) |X`, Z`, N`, I∗`
]
= X ′`γ (τ) ,
(see (2.10)). It suggests the quantile regression estimator
γ̂ (τ) = arg min
γ
L∑
`=1
ρΦ̂`(τ) (W` −X ′`γ) (4.2)
where ρΦ (u) = u (Φ− I (u < 0)), see e.g. Koenker (2005).
While the first step is a standard MLE estimator, the second step slope estimator involves
a random quantile level, which in addition must be estimated. As well known since Murphy
and Topel (1985), the first step estimation can affect the second step asymptotic property.
However, this can easily be captured using the proof techniques in Pollard (1991). Useful
assumptions and notations are as follows. In the sequel, (α, β) will be abbreviated in θ when
convenient. Let piθ (i|Z`, N`, θ) be θ derivative of pi (i|Z`, N`, θ). Under Assumption 5, the
Fisher information matrix for the asymmetry parameters can be defined as
I (θ) = Var
(
piθ (I∗` |Z`, N`, θ)
pi (I∗` |Z`, N`, θ)
)
or by using the Bartlett identity when Z` has a compact support as assumed below.
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Assumption 7 The auction variables (X`, N`, Z`, I
∗
` ,W`) are drawn identically and inde-
pendently. The support Z of Z` is compact.
Assumption 8 The identification equations (2.6) and (2.10) hold. The asymmetry param-
eter are identified and the Fisher information matrix I (θ) has an inverse.
Assumption 7 is standard. Assumption 8 imposes that the auction model is correctly
specified and that the asymmetry parameter are identified.
Consider now some additional notations for the second step estimator γ̂ (τ). Let the
τ derivative of ΨI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ) be denoted by Ψ
τ
I∗`
(τ ;Z`, N`, θ), which exists and is strictly
positive on (0, 1) as shown in the proof of Proposition 2. As the conditional quantile function
of the winning bid is
W (τ |X`, Z`, I∗` , N`) = X ′`γ
[
Ψ−1I∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ)
]
the conditional p.d.f. of the winning bid is, under Assumption 4,
fW (w|X`, Z`, I∗` , N`) =
1
W (1) [W−1 (w|X`, Z`, I∗` , N`) |X`, Z`, I∗` , N`]
=
ΨτI∗`
(
Ψ−1I∗` (W
−1 (w|X`, Z`, I∗` , N`) ;Z`, N`, θ) ;Z`, N`, θ
)
X ′`γ(1)
[
Ψ−1I∗` (W
−1 (w|X`, Z`, I∗` , N`) ;Z`, N`, θ)
]
which is continuous and bounded away from infinity over (V (0|X`) , V (1|X`)). Let the θ
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derivative of ΨI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ) be denoted by Ψ
θ
I∗`
(τ ;Z`, N`, θ) and define
H (τ) = E [X`X ′`fW (X ′`γ (τ) |X`, Z`, I∗` , N`)] ,
J (τ) = E
[
X`X
′
`
(
I (W` ≤ X ′`γ (τ))−ΨI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ)
)2]
C (τ) = E
[(
X`
(
I (W` ≤ X ′`γ (τ))−ΨI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ)
)) I−1 (θ)(piθ (I∗` |Z`, N`, θ)
pi (I∗` |Z`, N`, θ)
)′]
,
D (τ) = −E
[
ΨθI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ)X
′
`
]
.
The matrices H (τ) and J (τ) are specific to the infeasible quantile regression estimator γ˜ (τ)
of γ (τ) which uses the true asymmetry parameters (α, β) instead of their estimates,
γ˜ (τ) = arg min
γ
L∑
`=1
ρΨI∗
`
(τ ;Z`,N`,θ) (W` −X ′`γ) .
In particular, H−1 (τ) J (τ)H−1 (τ) is the asymptotic variance of γ˜ (τ), see Koenker (2005).
The matrix C (τ) is the asymptotic covariance of the infeasible γ˜ (τ) and
(
α̂, β̂
)
. Finally
D (τ) =
∂
∂θ∂γ′
E
[
ρΨI∗
`
(τ ;Z`,N`,θ) (W` −X ′`γ (τ))
]
is the θγ derivative of the population version of the objective function which is used for γ˜ (τ).
The asymptotic variance of the asymmetry parameter estimator
(
α̂, β̂
)
and of the feasible
γ̂ (τ) is given by the matrices I−1 (θ) and
V (τ) = H−1 (τ)
{
J (τ) +D (τ) I−1 (θ)D (τ)′ +D (τ)C (τ)′ + C (τ)D (τ)′}H−1 (τ)
Cγθ (τ) = H
−1 (τ)
{−C (τ)−D (τ) I−1 (θ)}
The next Theorem gives the asymptotic joint distribution of γ̂ (τ) and
(
α̂, β̂
)
.
Theorem 4 Suppose Assumptions 2-5, 7 and 8 hold. Then, for any quantile level τ in (0, 1),
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γ̂ (τ) and θ̂ =
(
α̂′, β̂′
)′
are asymptotically normal with
√
L
(
(γ̂ (τ)− γ (τ))′ ,
(
θ̂ − θ
)′)′ d→ N
0,
 V (τ) Cγθ (τ)
Cγθ (τ)
′ I(θ)−1
 .
Proof of Theorem 4: See proof section. 
While the asymptotic normality of the MLE θ̂ is standard, the one of γ̂ (τ) follows from
modifying the approach of Pollard (1991) to account for the first step estimation. The
asymptotic variance of these estimators can be estimated but it may be more suitable to
rely on bootstrap, especially for the parent slope function γ (·). Indeed, bootstrap is more
reliable for inference in quantile regression, see Koenker (2005) and the reference therein.
5 Simulations
In this section, we present the results of a Monte Carlo simulation designed to evaluate the
performance of the two-step estimation procedure.
Data Generating Process. We simulate L = 2000 ascending auctions withN = 5 bidders
assigned to K = 2 different classes: type 1 and type 2 with λ1 = 1 and λ2 = exp (2) = 7.39.
Bidders are assigned to each type with equal probability. Auction specific characteristics
x` is a random draw from U[1,3] , for ` = 1 . . . L, with an expected value of E[x`] = 2 and
X` = [1, x`]. The parent private value conditional quantile function is generated as
V (τ |X`) = X ′`γ(τ) = γ0 (τ) + γ1 (τ)x`, (5.1)
where the true quantile regression coefficients are
γ0 (τ) = τ
exp(1.5)/2; γ1 (τ) = τ
exp(1.5)/4.
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The number of simulation replications is set to 1000.
Estimation. The estimation is conducted in two steps. In the first step, the type pa-
rameters (λ1, λ2) are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation by maximizing (4.1)
over a grid of points. The quantile regression slope (γ0(τ), γ1(τ)) are then estimated in a
second step using (4.2). For the median x`, the estimated parent quantile function is given
by V̂ (τ |X`) = γ̂0 (τ) + 2γ̂1 (τ).
Results. Figure 1 compares the true private value quantile function (in black) with the
mean of the estimated private value quantile function across simulations (in red) for both
type 1 and type 2, considering a median x` auction. The bias and standard error (SE) for
the private value quantile function for both types is reported in Table 3. The simulation
results confirm that the two step estimation procedure works well.
Figure 1: Simulation: True vs. Estimated Private Value Quantile Function
Median Auction
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Type 2
True in black, mean of estimation across simulations in red, 95% confidence intervals in dotted lines
6 Application
In this section, we investigate asymmetry in timber auctions from the USFS using the
methodology developed in this paper. Bidders are classified as mill (with manufacturing
capacity to process the timber) and logger (lacking manufacturing capabilities). For sim-
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Table 3: Simulation: Bias and SE of Private Value Quantile Function
Type 1 Type 2
τ Bias SE Bias SE
0.1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0092 0.0560
0.2 −0.0003 0.0019 0.0020 0.0460
0.3 −0.0037 0.0022 −0.0013 0.0401
0.4 −0.0010 0.0143 −0.0023 0.0474
0.5 −0.0192 0.0288 −0.0028 0.0348
0.6 −0.0032 0.0526 −0.0030 0.0335
0.7 0.0091 0.0574 −0.0033 0.0309
0.8 0.0024 0.0460 −0.0053 0.0291
0.9 −0.0026 0.0357 −0.0103 0.0300
plicity in the exposition, mills and loggers are abbreviated by M and L, respectively, when
convenient. The dataset aggregates 7,462 ascending auctions (i.e., winning bids) that oc-
curred in the western part of the US during the period of 1982-90. The sample contains a set
of variables characterizing each timber tract including the estimated volume of the timber
(measured in thousand of board feet - mbf) and its estimated appraisal value (given in Dollar
per unit of volume). Mills won in about 72% of the auctions. The descriptive statistics can
be found in Table 4. The auctioned tract exhibits significant heterogeneity in quality and
size. The contracts to extract the timber last, on average, 2 years. Bidders participation is
high. On average, there are 6 bidders attending the auctions in a range of 2 to 12.
In what follows, a median auction is an auction where the appraisal value and the volume
are set to their median value. With the exception of Figure 3, all the figures and tables of
this section and Appendix B are for a median auction.
6.1 Private value quantile functions
We use a type fixed effect specification for the asymmetry parameter λi`, with λi` = λM
if bidder i at auction ` is a mill and λi` = λL if it is a logger. For identification, we
normalize λM = 1. The first step estimation gives λ̂L = 0.6988 with a 95% confidence
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Winning bids ($ per tbf) 126.43 136.22 5,145.71 0.14
Appraisal value ($ per tbf) 58.65 60.35 793.62 0.25
Volume (tbf) 4,466.89 4,418.41 39,920 8
Contract Length (years) 1.96 1.3 42 0.1
Number of bidders 5.77 3.09 12 2
Number of loggers 1.74 2.10 11 0
Number of mills 4.03 3.02 12 0
Bidders in the winner’s class 4.52 2.73 12 1
interval computed by pairwise bootstrap given by [0.6516, 0.7554], which shows that loggers
are indeed significantly weaker than mills. In particular, the logger winning probability is
41.1% when each type are in equal proportions, 70% of the probability that a mill wins the
ascending auction, which is 58.8%.
This is confirmed by Figure 2, which gives the estimated private value quantile functions
of mills (red) and loggers (blue) and their 95% confidence bands computed via pairwise
bootstrap method for a median auction. The private value conditional distribution of mills
first-order stochastically dominates the one of loggers, especially in the upper part of the
distribution.
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Figure 2: Private Value Conditional Quantile Function of Loggers and Mills
Median Auction
The 95% confidence intervals for the quantile regression estimates were computed by resampling with replacement the
(X`,W`)-pair. Mills in red and loggers in blue.
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The power specification of the private value quantile functions allows to highlight which
variable generates asymmetry. Indeed, a constant slope function in the parent private value
quantile regression means that the impact of the associated variable is identical for each
type of bidders. Figure 3 gives the quantile regression coefficients of the private value parent
distribution. The estimated volume slope function looks constant, and possibly not signifi-
cant. As the power transformation will not make bidders to differ in terms of volume slope
functions, this suggests that capacity constraint is not binding for both types. In contrast,
the parent appraisal value slope function does not look constant, and this variable is much
likely to generate differences across mills and loggers. Figure 3, therefore, suggests that
asymmetry is driven by qualitative (e.g. ability to improve on the appraisal value of the
timber) and unobserved factors (captured by the intercept), instead of capacity constraints.
Interestingly, coping for asymmetry gives appraisal value slope estimated functions that vary
much less across quantile levels than in Gimenes (2017).
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Figure 3: Private Value Parent Quantile Regression Coefficients
The 95% confidence intervals for the quantile regression estimates were computed by resampling with replacement the
(X`,W`)-pair. Top intercept, middle appraisal value and bottom volume estimated slope functions.
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6.2 Expected revenue and optimal reserve price
We now investigate the effect of asymmetry on the seller’s expected revenue and optimal
reserve price. Given that we recover all the primitives of the game, we can evaluate the seller
expected revenue as the proportion of types changes. This contrasts with Coey et al. (2017)
who averages over the type proportion. In sections 6.2 and 6.3, the seller’s outside option
value V0 appearing in Proposition 3 is set to 0. The expected revenue can be estimated
from (3.1) by plugging in the estimation V̂ (·|X) of the parent quantile regression. Plotting
r ∈ [0, 1] 7→
(
V̂ (r|X), Π̂ (r|X)
)
gives a graph of the estimated seller’s expected revenue
achieved with a reserve price R = V̂ (r|X).
Figure 4 shows estimates of the expected revenue as a function of the reserve price for
each N and type proportion. The dotted vertical lines give the optimal reserve price for
each proportion of types. As the colors of the curves become warmer (from blue to red and
yellow), loggers are replaced by mills and the revenue level increases in a parallel way. The
expected revenue functions have clear maximas for small numbers of bidders (typically N = 2
or N = 3), contrasting with the estimation obtained with symmetric bidders in Gimenes and
Guerre (2019). For larger N , the expected revenues look flat in their central part, a fact
which cannot be seen from the estimation set strategy of Coey et al. (2017).
As a consequence, implementing an optimal reserve price is mostly useful when the prob-
ability of observing a small number of bidders is high. The optimal reserve prices shown in
Figure 4 and detailed in the Appendix Table B.3 depend upon N and type proportion, but
exhibit a moderate 7% variation, staying in the interval [104.7, 111.9] and slightly increasing
with the number of mills. As the expected revenues are flat around their maxima, using a
reserve price in the range [104.7, 111.9] gives an expected revenue close to its maxima. This
includes the optimal reserve price 107.9$ estimated from a symmetric specification, as in
Gimenes (2017), given in B.3. As the expected revenue with no reserve price is mostly below
100$ when N ≤ 5 as seen from Table 5 below, using such a reserve price may mean not
selling the auctioned lot if a small number of bidders participates.4
4To see this, observe that the probability of selling is the probability that the maximum private value
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Figure 4: Strategical Expected Revenue and Optimal Reserve Price
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6.3 Type variation and additional bidder effects
Table 5: Non Strategical Expected Revenue
One logger replaced by one mill
Min ER Max ER Max %∆ [ Min %, Max % ]
N = 2 48.02 57.65 19.61% [ 8.84%, 9.89% ]
[46.37, 50.42] [56.20, 59.70]
N = 3 63.59 75.04 18.01% [ 5.42%, 5.83% ]
[61.61, 66.03 [73.30, 77.47]
N = 5 84.25 98.64 17.08% [ 2.78%, 3.63% ]
[81.82, 87.14] [96.51, 101.45]
N = 8 105.28 120.17 14.14% [ 1.35%, 2.02% ]
[102.57, 108.42] [117.68, 123.34]
N = 10 115.22 129.55 12.44% [ 0.93%, 1.48% ]
[112.45, 118.58] [126.59, 132.95]
N = 12 123.05 136.52 10.95% [ 0.66%, 1.12% ]
[120.23, 126.19] [133.61, 139.96]
The 95% confidence intervals for the quantile regression estimates were computed by resampling with replacement the
(X`,W`)-pair.
In this section, we study the effects of changes in the bidder’s type proportion and ad-
ditional bidders on the expected revenue. For that, we set the largest N to its maximal
observed value 12, see tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B. The 95% boostrapped confidence
intervals for the expected revenue given in these tables have a length ranging from 2$ to 6$,
corresponding to revenues varying between 48$ and 137$ 5. The bootstrapped 95% confi-
dence intervals of the strategical seller expected revenue, achieved using an optimal reserve
price, and the non strategical one, obtained with a non binding reserve price, overlaps up to
N = 6. Similarly, the revenue gain achieved when an additional bidder of any type enters
V(N) is above the reserve price R. The Markov inequality gives the bound E[V(N)]/R for the latter. A proxy
for E[V(N)]/R is the non strategical revenue Π(0) when the seller value is 0, suggesting to use the bound
Π(0)/R for the probability of selling.
5The bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the optimal reserve price have a larger length, between 12$
and 14$ for an optimal reserve price between 104$ and 112$. As a matter of comparison, Coey et al. (2017)’s
set identified confidence bounds for the seller revenue and optimal reserve price look huge, but they also
allow for affiliated values.
29
Table 6: Strategical Expected Revenue
One logger replaced by one mill
Min ER Max ER Max %∆ [ Min %, Max % ]
N = 2 69.65 76.44 9.75% [ 4.57%, 4.95% ]
[68.64, 70.92] [75.45, 77.77]
N = 3 77.97 86.95 11.52% [ 3.44%, 3.98% ]
[76.60, 79.67] [85.62, 88.73]
N = 5 92.16 103.9 12.74% [ 2.14%, 2.75% ]
[90.27, 94.45] [102.06, 106.30]
N = 8 108.63 121.86 12.18% [ 1.20%, 1.73% ]
[106.32, 111.36] [119.54, 124.84]
N = 10 117.16 130.37 11.28% [ 0.86%, 1.33% ]
[114.70, 119.99] [127.76, 133.61]
N = 12 124.2 136.92 10.24% [ 0.63%, 1.03% ]
[121.63, 127.20] [134.11, 140.35]
The 95% confidence intervals for the quantile regression estimates were computed by resampling with replacement the
(X`,W`)-pair.
looks significant, at least for auctions with up to 7 initial bidders for additional logger and,
for mill, up to some auctions with N = 10. Setting the largest N to 12 is therefore expected
to capture all the statistically significant policy effects delivered by the sample. We now
focus on each of these effects.
Revenue and types. Point estimation of bidders’ private value distributions permits in-
vestigation of changes in the number of bidders of a given type. Tables 5, 6 and 7 give a
summary of all universe of changes, see also Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.
Table 5 considers a non strategical expected revenue, which means that reserve price is
non binding, whereas Table 6 focuses on the optimal revenue6. All the results are obtained
for a given N . The second and third columns of both tables give the minimum and maximum
6As suggested in Coey, Larsen and Sweeney (2019), a comparison between a strategical and non strategical
expected revenue can be fruitful to the seller due to the costs that a policy of setting an optimal reserve price
may impose in practice. Recent works have highlighted the asymmetric effects on seller’s revenue due to
mistakes in choosing reserve prices (see e.g. Kim (2013), Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2016), Coey et al. (2019)
and Gimenes (2017))
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values of the seller expected revenue across type proportions. The minimum and maximum
values of the revenue in both cases are obtained when only loggers and only mills are par-
ticipating, respectively. The percentage change in revenue when changing all loggers into
mills is given in the fourth column and is an additional measure of asymmetry. It is, on
average, 15.4% in the non strategical case and 11.3% in Table 6. These order of magnitude
are similar to the one found in Roberts and Sweeting (2016) who employ a parametric spec-
ification.7 The fifth column gives the maximum and minimum percentage changes obtained
when replacing one logger by one mill. All these results suggest that the seller should either
incentivize mills participation or subsidize higher loggers bid as studied in Flambard and
Perrigne (2006), Marion (2007) or Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) for the latter.
Table 7: Violations of Bulow and Klemperer (1996), N = 2, 3, 4
N (Logger,Mill) Non strat. ER Strat. ER Additional Logger Additional Mill
N = 2 (2,0) 48.02 69.65 63.59∗ 67.30
(1,1) 52.46 73.10 67.30∗ 71.18
(0,2) 57.65 76.44 71.18∗ 75.04
N = 3 (3,0) 63.59 77.97 74.82 78.23
(2,1) 67.30 81.07 78.23 81.63
(1,2) 71.18 84.06 81.63 84.96
(0,3) 75.04 86.95 84.96 88.17
N = 4 (4,0) 74.82 85.44 84.25 87.31
(3,1) 78.23 88.24 87.31 90.30
(2,2) 81.63 90.93 90.30 93.19
(1,3) 84.96 93.53 93.19 95.97
(0,4) 88.17 96.03 95.97 98.64
An underlined revenue indicates a violation of Bulow and Klemperer (1996), ie the considered non strategical revenue obtained
by adding a bidder of a given type is below the strategical one. A “*” indicates that the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval
of the strategical revenue and the non strategical one with an additional bidder of the considered type do not overlap.
Revenue and additional bidders. An important result by Bulow and Klemperer (1996)
states that the seller’s expected revenue achieved in an ascending auction with no reserve
7These authors also allow for entry decision but their estimate “indicate a moderate effect of selection”.
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price but an additional bidder is higher than the one of any allocation mechanism, that
includes the case of an ascending auction with an optimal reserve price, under symmetry
and a downward sloping marginal revenue condition.8 Table 7 reports several violations of
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) arising in our asymmetric framework. The “Strat. ER” column
of Table 7 indicates the estimated optimal expected revenue achieved with N = 2, 3 and 4
bidders, with number of loggers or mills as indicated in the second column. The last two
columns give the estimated non strategical expected revenue obtained when adding a logger
or a mill.
Table 7 shows that using an optimal reserve price is always more profitable than adding
a weak logger bidder. Adding a mill bidder is also less profitable than using the optimal
auction but only when N = 2 and in a much less significant way than adding a logger.
Table 7 shows that the difference of revenue using the optimal auction and adding a logger
decreases with N , in average across type proportion. By contrast the revenue difference
using the optimal auction and adding a mill increase with N .9 The systematic violations of
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) when adding a logger suggests that the logger private value
distribution does not satisfy the downward sloping marginal revenue condition.10 When
N ≥ 4, using the optimal reserve price is less profitable than participation of an additional
bidder of any type, up to few minor exceptions. However the differences of expected revenue
between an optimal reserve price and an additional bidder are at best in the range of 3$,
which is close to the half length of the boostrapped 95% confidence interval for the strategical
8See Coey et al. (2019) for a recent econometric application to entry exogeneity.
9Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B also report the revenues obtained for an estimation of a symmetric
private value model as in Gimenes (2017). Interestingly violations of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) occur for
N = 2, 3 but not for larger N .
10The downwards sloping marginal revenue condition of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) requires that
− d
dt
[Vi(t)(1− t)] = V
(
t1/λi
)
− (1− t) t
1/λi−1
λi
V (1)
(
t1/λi
)
increases with t. If V (1)(0) > 0 and 1/2 < λi < 1, the leading term when t goes to 0 of the derivative of this
function is −(1/λi − 1) t1/λi−2λi V (1)(0) which is negative, so that the considered condition is not compatible
with our estimation of λL.
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and non strategical seller’s expected revenues.
7 Conclusion
The paper considers a semiparametric specification for asymmetric private value distribu-
tion under the independent private value distribution setup. The bidders share a common
parent distribution which is generated by a quantile regression model. Asymmetry is driven
by powers applied to the parent distribution. These powers can depend upon individual
and/or group fixed effects, bidder and/or auction specific variables. The specification can
be estimated by a two stage procedure from the winning bid and winner’s identity. This
quantile regression specification is not affected by the curse of dimensionality and can cope
with data-rich environment. Unlike common parametric specifications, it is expected to be
less affected by misspecification due to its nonparametric nature. Usual parametric rates
nevertheless apply and estimation techniques remain standard. The parametric power com-
ponent of the model allows for a simple evaluation of bidder’s asymmetry and of its economic
implications.
A timber auction application has been used to illustrate the implication of asymmetry.
The estimated asymmetry parameter means that weaker bidders have 30% less chances to
win the auction than stronger ones. The quantile regression specification allows to detect the
variables that affect the bidders in a symmetric way, here volume, suggesting that bidders
face similar capacity constraints, and the other variables that represent characteristics of
asymmetry. The shape of the expected revenue varies a lot with the number N of bidders,
being mostly flat for N > 5, with an optimal revenue close to the one achieved in the absence
of a reserve price. For small N , the choice of a reserve price does matter, but the estimated
optimal one does not vary too much with N and type proportion. The effect of asymmetry is
mild here, and using the one estimated from a misspecified symmetric model should protect
the seller against revenue loss occurring for small N . On the other hand, and as expected,
the proportion of small bidders may importantly affect the seller’ expected revenue. This
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suggests that the seller can benefit from preference policies which would strengthen the weak
bidders. A striking finding is that, in small auctions with less than four bidders, increasing
participation, as recommended by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) in a symmetric environment,
may give a smaller revenue than using an optimal reserve price, due to the presence of weak
bidders. As a consequence, the choice of a proper reserve price may be a more important
tool under asymmetry than when the bidders are symmetric.
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Appendix A - Proof section
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Assumption 5 yields that the function Ψi (τ ;Z, α, β) = Ψi (τ) is well-defined as λ (Zi;αi, β) =
λi > 0. Set ΛN = ΛN (Z;α, β), ΛN |i = ΛN |i (Z;α, β) = ΛN − λi so that
Ψi (τ) =
ΛNτ
ΛN|i − ΛN |iτΛN
λi
,
∂Ψi (τ)
∂τ
=
ΛNΛN |iτΛN|i−1
λi
(
1− τλi) .
Hence Ψi (·) is continuous and strictly increasing. (2.10) and Assumption 3 then yield
γ (τ) = E−1 [XX ′]× E [XW (Ψi (τ) |X,Z, i)]
for all τ in [0, 1]. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Ignore, for the sake of brevity, the conditioning variables. Under assumption 6, the seller
possible payoffs are
pi (r) =

V0 if VN :N < R
R if VN−1:N < R ≤ VN :N ,
VN−1:N if R ≤ VN−1:N ,
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where Vi:N is the ith-lowest order statistics of private values, i.e. VN :N is the first highest
order statistic and VN−1:N the second largest one. Recall that r = F (R), or equivalently
R = V (r). The next three points evaluate the contribution of each of the three events above
to the seller revenue.
1. P (VN :N < R) = P (Vi < R,∀i = 1, . . . , N) = ΠNi=1Fi (R) = ΠNi=1 [F (V (r))]λi = rΛN . It
follows that the probability of selling is 1−rΛN , hence, Proposition 3-(i) is proven. The
contribution of this event to the seller revenue is pi1(r) = V0r
ΛN ;
2. P (VN−1:N < R ≤ VN :N) =
∑N
i=1 Πj 6=iFj (R) (1− Fi (R)) =
∑N
i=1 r
ΛN|i(1 − rλi). The
contribution of this second event to the seller revenue is pi2(r) = V (r)
∑N
i=1 r
ΛN|i(1 −
rλi);
3. Let FN−1:N(v) denote the c.d.f. of the second-highest order statistic VN−1:N , which is
FN−1:N(v) =
N∏
i=1
Fi(v) +
N∑
i=1
∏
j 6=i
Fj(v)(1− Fi(v)).
Under Assumption 2
FN−1:N(v) = [F (v)]ΛN +
N∑
i=1
[
(1− (F (v))λi).(F (v))ΛN|i]
= [F (v)]ΛN +
N∑
i=1
[(F (v))ΛN|i − (F (v))ΛN ]
= (1−N)(F (v))ΛN +
N∑
i=1
(F (v))ΛN|i .
The change of variable v = V (t) then gives that the contribution of the third event to
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pi (r) as
pi3 (r) =
∫ 1
r
vdFN−1:N(v) =
∫ 1
r
V (t) d
[
(1−N)tΛN +
N∑
i=1
tΛN|i
]
=
∫ 1
r
V (t)
{
(1−N)ΛN tΛN−1 +
N∑
i=1
ΛN |itΛN|i−1
}
dt.
As Π (r) = pi1 (r) + pi2 (r) + pi3 (r), Proposition 3-(ii) is proved. It also follows that
∂Π (r)
∂r
= V0ΛNr
ΛN−1 + V (1)(r)
N∑
i=1
rΛN|i(1− rλi) +R
N∑
i=1
(
ΛN |irΛN|i−1 − ΛNrΛN−1
)
−R
{
ΛNr
ΛN−1 +
N∑
i=1
(
ΛN |irΛN|i−1 − ΛNrΛN−1
)}
= (V0 −R) ΛNrΛN−1 + V (1)(r)
N∑
i=1
rΛN|i(1− rλi)
= ΛNr
ΛN−1
{
V0 −R− V
(1)(r)r
ΛN
N∑
i=1
(1− r−λi)
}
.
Note that the optimal r∗ must belong to the open set (0, 1). Hence the FOC
∂Π(r∗)
∂r
= 0 gives
that Proposition 3-(iii) holds. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
By Theorems 2.5 and 3.3, the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Newey and McFadden (1994), it holds
under Assumptions 5, 7 and 8
√
L
(
θ̂ − θ
)
= Σ̂ + oP (1) , Σ̂ = I (θ)−1 1√
L
L∑
`=1
piθ (I∗` |Z`, N`, θ)
pi (I∗` |Z`, N`, θ)
+ oP (1) . (A.1)
For γ̂ (τ), define
Q̂ (γ;ϑ) =
1
L
L∑
`=1
ρΨI∗
`
(τ ;Z`,N`,ϑ) (W` −X ′`γ)
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which is such that γ̂ (τ) = arg minγ Q̂
(
γ; θ̂
)
and γ˜ (τ) = arg minγ Q̂ (γ; θ). The proof makes
use of the following partial derivatives
Q̂ϑ =
∂Q̂ (γ;ϑ)
∂ϑ
∣∣∣∣∣
(γ,ϑ)=(γ(τ),θ)
=
1
L
L∑
`=1
(W` −X ′`γ (τ)) ΨθI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ) , Qϑ = E
[
Q̂ϑ
]
,
Q̂ϑϑ =
1
L
L∑
`=1
(W` −X ′`γ (τ)) ΨθθI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ) , Qϑϑ = E
[
Q̂ϑϑ
]
Q̂ϑγ = − 1
L
L∑
`=1
ΨθI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ)X
′
`, D (τ) = E
[
Q̂ϑγ
]
.
Let Ŝ/
√
L = Ŝ (τ) /
√
L be the γ-derivative of Q̂ (γ; θ) taken at γ (τ)
Ŝ =
1√
L
L∑
`=1
X`
[
I (W` ≤ X ′`γ (τ))−ΨI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ)
]
.
Define the objective function
Q̂ (ξ) = L
Q̂
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
; θ̂
)
− Q̂ (γ (τ) ; θ)− Q̂′ϑ
(
θ̂ − θ
)
−
(
θ̂ − θ
)′
Q̂ϑϑ
(
θ̂ − θ
)
2

which is such that
√
L (γ̂ (τ)− γ (τ)) = arg min
ξ
Q̂ (ξ) .
For simplicity of notation, denote ΨI∗` (τ ;Z`, N`, θ) = ΨI∗` . Arguing as in Pollard (1991,
p.192) yields, for each fixed ξ,
L
{
Q̂
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
; θ
)
− Q̂ (γ (τ) ; θ)
}
= Ŝ ′ξ +
1
2
ξ′H (τ) ξ +
L∑
`=1
(
R˜` (ξ)− E
[
R˜` (ξ)
])
(A.2)
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where
R˜` (ξ) =
{
ρΨI∗
`
(
W` −X ′`
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
))
− ρΨI∗
`
(W` −X ′`γ (τ))
}
−
(
1√
L
X`
[
I (W` ≤ X ′`γ (τ))−ΨI∗`
])′
ξ
∑L
`=1
(
R˜` (ξ)− E
[
R˜` (ξ)
])
contributes only oP (1) to (A.2). To see this note that ρa(b) =
(a− I(b < 0))b = ∫ b
0
(a− I(t < 0))dt and denote δ`(ξ) = X ′`ξ/
√
L and D˜`(τ) = W` −X ′`γ(τ)
R˜` (ξ) = ρΨI∗
`
(
D˜`(τ)− δ`(ξ)
)
− ρΨI∗
`
(
D˜`(τ)
)
− δ`(ξ)
[
I
(
D˜`(τ) ≤ 0
)
−ΨI∗` (τ ; θ)
]
=
∫ δ`(ξ)
0
[
I
(
D˜`(τ) ≤ t
)
− I
(
D˜`(τ) ≤ 0
)]
dt.
Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
R˜` (ξ)
2 ≤ |δ`(ξ)|
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ δ`(ξ)
0
I
(∣∣∣D˜` (τ)∣∣∣ ≤ |t|) dt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |δ`(ξ)|
∫ |δ`(ξ)|
0
I
(∣∣∣D˜` (τ ; )∣∣∣ ≤ |t|) dt.
Denote ||fW (·|·)||∞= supw,x,z |fW (w|X,Z, I∗, N)|.
E
[
R˜2 (ξ) |X,Z, I∗, N
]
≤ |δ(ξ)|
∫ |δ(ξ)|
0
{∫
I (|w −X ′γ (τ) | ≤ |t|) fW (w|X,Z, I∗, N)dw
}
dt,
≤ ||fW (·|·)||∞ |δ(ξ)|
∫ |δ(ξ)|
0
{∫
I (|w −X ′γ (τ) | ≤ |t|) dw
}
dt,
≤ ||fW (·|·)||∞ |δ(ξ)|
∫ |δ(ξ)|
0
2|t|dt = ||fW (·|·)||∞ |δ(ξ)|3 ≤ C||X||
3||ξ||3
L3/2
.
E
[
R˜2 (ξ)
]
= E
[
E
[
R˜2 (ξ) |X,Z, I∗, N
]]
≤ E
[
C||X||3||ξ||3
L3/2
]
≤ C||ξ||
3
L3/2
.
Due to cancellation of cross-product terms
E
∣∣∣∣∣
L∑
`=1
(
R˜` (ξ)− E
[
R˜` (ξ)
])∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ≤ L∑
`=1
E
[
R˜2` (ξ)
]
≤ C||ξ||
3
√
L
= o(1).
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Lemma 2.4 in Newey and McFadden (1994) also gives
Q̂
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
; θ̂
)
− Q̂
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
; θ
)
− Q̂′ϑ
(
θ̂ − θ
)
=
[∫ 1
0
{
Q̂′ϑ
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
; θ + t
(
θ̂ − θ
))
− Q̂′ϑ (γ (τ) ; θ)
}
dt
](
θ̂ − θ
)
=
(
θ̂ − θ
)′
Q̂ϑϑ
(
θ̂ − θ
)
2
+
(
θ̂ − θ
)′
Q̂ϑγ
ξ√
L
+ oP
(
1
L
)
=
(
θ̂ − θ
)′
Q̂ϑϑ
(
θ̂ − θ
)
2
+
(
θ̂ − θ
)′
D (τ)
ξ√
L
+ oP
(
1
L
)
.
Hence, for each fixed ξ,
Q̂ (ξ) = L
Q̂
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
; θ̂
)
− Q̂
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
; θ
)
− Q̂′ϑ
(
θ̂ − θ
)
−
(
θ̂ − θ
)′
Q̂ϑϑ
(
θ̂ − θ
)
2

+ L
{
Q̂
(
γ (τ) +
ξ√
L
; θ
)
− Q̂ (γ (τ) ; θ)
}
=
(
Ŝ +D (τ)
√
L
(
θ̂ − θ
))′
ξ +
1
2
ξ′H (τ) ξ + oP (1)
=
(
Ŝ +D (τ) Σ̂
)′
ξ +
1
2
ξ′H (τ) ξ + oP (1)
where the last line is from (A.1). Applying the convexity arguments in Pollard (1991) then
gives, since
√
L (γ̂ (τ)− γ (τ)) = arg minξ Q̂ (ξ),
√
L (γ̂ (τ)− γ (τ)) = −H (τ)−1
(
Ŝ +D (τ) Σ̂
)
+ oP (1) .
Then the joint asymptotic distribution of
√
L (γ̂ (τ)− γ (τ)) and √L
(
θ̂ − θ
)
is the one
of −H (τ)−1
(
Ŝ +D (τ) Σ̂
)
and Σ̂ by (A.1), which by the CLT is a centered normal with
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covariance matrix Var(H (τ)−1 (Ŝ +D (τ) Σ̂)) −Cov (H (τ)−1 (Ŝ +D (τ) Σ̂) , Σ̂)
−Cov
(
Σ̂, H (τ)−1
(
Ŝ +D (τ) Σ̂
))
I (θ)−1
 ,
which can be written as in the Theorem. 
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Appendix B - Tables
This appendix displays tables that were commented on but not included in the empirical
application. All tables are for median ascending auctions. The second column in all the three
tables gives the corresponding estimates considering the methodology proposed in Gimenes
(2017) with symmetric bidders for N = 2, 3, . . . , 12. If the econometrician does not take
asymmetry into account, the seller’s expected revenue, Π (r|X,N, V0) is
Π (r|X,N, V0) = V0rN +RNrN−1 (1− r)
+N(N − 1)
∫ 1
r
V (t|X) tN−2 (1− t) dt
and the optimal reserve price is R∗ = V (r∗|X) with r∗ = arg maxr Π (r|X,N, V0). The seller
value V0 is set to 0 and the private value quantile function is estimated as in Gimenes (2017).
Note that this differs from Section 3.2, where the true asymmetric distribution was used to
compute the revenue achieved using a optimal reserve price from the misspecified symmetric
model. Estimates taking into account asymmetry among the bidders, as discussed in this
paper, are given on columns three to eight. They were computed using the expressions
3.1 and 3.2. The proportion of bidder’s types are given in parentheses following the rule
(#Loggers,#Mills).
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